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Abstract 
The curvature of utility functions varies between people. We suggest that there 
exists a relationship between the mode in which a person usually makes a decision and 
the curvature of the individual utility function. In a deliberate decision mode, a decision-
maker tends to have a nearly linear utility function. In an intuitive decision mode, the 
utility function is more curved. In our experiment the utility function is assessed with a 
lottery-based utility elicitation method and related to a measure that assesses the habitual 
preference for intuition and deliberation (Betsch, submitted). Results confirm that for 
people that habitually use the deliberate decision mode, the utility function is more linear 
than for people that habitually use the intuitive decision mode. The finding and its 
implications for the research on individual decision behavior in economics and 
psychology are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
The question how people resolve decision problems under risk and uncertainty 
has been investigated in economics and psychology over decades. Theories of decision-
making that dominate economic theory and that are rooted in the economics literature 
model choice as a maximization of preferences and assume that “agents behave as if 
optimizing some underlying preference function” (Starmer, 2000, p. 349); psychological 
research has been more concerned with modeling the processes that lead to decisions – 
Starmer subsumes the results of these efforts as “procedural theories” (p.350).  The most 
widespread example of a fertilization between preference maximization approaches and 
procedural approaches is certainly Kahneman and Tversky’s (cumulative) prospect 
theory ((C)PT, Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992). 
Many empirical studies on decision making under monetary risk find that humans 
are far from linear integration of weight and value in their solution of a risky decision 
problem and support directly the ideas put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (e.g., 
Abdellaoui, 2000; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Fox, 1995). Specifically, these 
experimental studies show that individual value functions deviate from linearity in many 
cases; for most people they are inversely S-shaped, which is interpreted as risk averse 
decision behavior when gambling for monetary gains and risk seeking behavior in 
gambles with loss outcomes.  
Additionally, various experiments have shown that the mode in which a decision 
is made, i.e. if a decision is made intuitively or deliberately, can strongly influence the 
decision outcome, post-choice satisfaction, the goodness of judgments and different other 
features of decision problems (e.g. Wilson & Schooler, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993; Betsch 
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et al., in press). In this case, being intuitive does not mean a tendency to follow simple 
heuristics and cognitive shortcuts as put forward by Kahneman et al. (1982). Intuitive 
processing is rather captured as following instant, effortless evaluation processes 
(Hogarth, 2001), involving an automatic, affective good-bad like reaction. Various 
models capture the intuitive mode as complementary concept to a deliberate, effortful, 
planned and analytic way of taking decisions (e.g. Bargh, 1989; Chaiken, 1980; Epstein, 
1983; Hogarth, 2001). Furthermore, there is strong evidence that individuals differ in the 
way they habitually use the intuitive or deliberate decision mode (e.g. Agor, 1994, 
Betsch, submitted; Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2003).  
As recent research proposes, the decision mode can significantly influence the 
perception of value (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004, Exp. 1): Participants were confronted 
with comparative willingness-to-pay questions; when primed to evaluate their WTP by 
calculation (i.e. deliberation), participants’ WTP varied significantly from the WTP after 
being primed to evaluate by feelings (i.e. by intuition). Although not directly tested in the 
experiments by Hsee & Rottenstreich, their findings substantiate the speculation that the 
more people use their feelings in the evaluation of the lotteries, the more the resulting 
value function is curved; conversely, people using calculation-based reasoning in their 
judgment should have a less curved value function1.  
The aforementioned findings suggest that habitual decision modes might 
influence people’s decisions over monetary values; that is, they are related to the shape of 
                                                 
1 Similar to these findings, the authors state in earlier work that the probability weighting 
function can be dependent on features of the lotteries such as the affect connected with the judged 
object: the weighting function was found to be more curved when the lotteries involved affect-
rich in contrast to affect-poor goods (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). 
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people’s value function. We therefore hypothesize that there exists a testable relationship 
between the individuals’ general tendency to behave rather deliberatively or intuitively 
and the way they evaluate monetary outcomes in risky decisions. We argue that intuitive 
people’s subjective assessment should be more influenced by affective reactions (c.f. 
Loewenstein et al., 2001) than the subjective assessment of deliberate people. The 
subjective values of the latter group should correspond more closely to the stated 
monetary values presented in the experiment. Thus, keeping all other influences equal, 
such as an influence of individual assessment of probability values, individually preferred 
decision modes should account for differences in the individual utility functions in a 
systematic manner.  
Concretely, our hypothesis claims that the monetary utility function of people 
with a preference for deliberate decision making deviates less from linearity than the one 
of non-deliberate decision makers. Conversely, the more people are intuitive when it 
comes to decision-making, the more their utility function should deviate from the linear 
form, i.e. the more it should be curved.  
This hypothesis was tested in a lottery-based experiment. First, we assessed 
subjects’ utility functions, based on a sequence of individually adapted lottery questions. 
Then, participants filled in an inventory that assessed their Preference for Intuition and 
Deliberation (PID, Betsch, submitted). Based on the lottery choices we were able to 
estimate an index for the curvature of the utility function. The test of our hypothesis is 
based on an analysis of the relationship between the curvature of individual utility 
functions and the individual preference for deliberation and intuition.  
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2. Method 
Participants & Design  
A total of 68 participants took part in the experiment. The study involved students 
of the University of Mannheim and was run in groups of about 17 students at a time. In 
this correlational design all participants were administered the same procedure described 
below. Based on the data from the preference for intuition and deliberation scale 
participants can be classified as dominantly deliberate or dominantly intuitive, allowing 
for a between-subjects comparison of the curvature.  
 
Procedure 
The entire experiment was run on computers using software written by the first 
author. A group of 5 subjects had participated in a pilot study which allowed for the 
adjustment of the software and the experimental protocol.  
After subjects had entered the room they were told that they will repeatedly have 
to make decisions between two lotteries. The lotteries A and B were presented next to 
each other on the computer screen. Participants could indicate their choice by clicking on 
the respective button A or B on the computer screen. When they clicked on the button the 
next lottery appeared on the screen. The participants answered all lottery questions at 
their own pace. At the end of the experiment, the students answered the PID 
questionnaire on the computer screen. By clicking at one of five radio buttons they 
indicated their agreement with the statements. After the procedure the participants were 
thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.  
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In order to provide incentives and to enhance motivation, we informed subjects 
that after the session was over, one of the subjects participating in each experimental 
session was randomly selected to play for a real monetary pay-off based on his or her 
choices made in one of the lottery tasks. Since the outcomes of the lotteries were up to € 
6000, we informed the subjects that the randomly selected person played for 1% of the 
positive outcomes (i.e. the gains) presented in the lotteries2.  
In the next section we describe the materials in more detail.  
 
3. Materials 
 
Value function elicitation 
A value function assigns a subjective value to a stated (objective) value. To elicit 
such a function, it is necessary to elicit for every individual a number of points in the 
coordinate plane spanned between the stated and the subjective values (the utility of the 
stated values, for an illustration cf. figure 1).  
 
*** insert figure 1 about here *** 
 
Various methods exist to construct individual value functions, i.e. to assess these 
points, from observed decisions in a series of monetary gambles (Farquhar, 1984). Our 
elicitation mechanism is based on a method proposed by Abdellaoui (2000). In this 
method seven points are identified, {x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, from which the utility 
function can be estimated. This can be done for the gain domain and the loss domain, 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, the experiment has included a price search task. Experimental results on the price 
search task are found in Schunk and Winter (2004). 
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resulting in two different parameters describing the utility function: alpha describes the 
utility function in the gain domain, beta in the risk domain.  
To identify one single point xi, participants had to make 5 decisions between 
lotteries. The lottery outcomes are adapted based on the prior decision of the subject, in 
order to determine - after 5 iterations - an outcome xi that makes the subject indifferent 
between the lotteries A and B. This indifference is achieved as follows: If the subjects 
chooses lottery B, that is she prefers lottery B to lottery A, then the value of  xi  is  
decreased, such that lottery B is less attractive. Conversely, if the subject prefers lottery 
A to lottery B, then the value of xi is increased, such that lottery B gets more attractive. 
These steps are repeated 5 times for all elicited points xi.  
 
*** insert figure 2 about here *** 
 
We now describe this procedure in detail: Individuals’ utility function on the gain 
and on the loss domain is elicited using a series of 64 individually adapted lottery choice 
questions presented by the computer. Four of the lottery questions appear twice during 
the lottery elicitation process, providing the possibility to assess the preference reversal 
rate.  
The method of utility function elicitation is based on the construction of so-called 
standard sequences of outcomes, {x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, i.e. monetary outcomes that 
are equally spaced in terms of their utility. In our design, we use a 5-step interval 
bisection procedure to determine an outcome x1 that makes the subject indifferent 
between the lotteries A=(x0, p; R, 1-p) and B=(x1, p; r, 1-p) (see figure 2), where x0, R, x1 
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and r denote monetary payoffs of the lottery and p and (1-p) denote the probabilities of 
the respective payoffs (see figure 2). Here, we have 0§ r< R<x0< x1 and r, R and x0 are 
held fixed. The answers to the first 5 presented lottery choice questions let us determine 
the desired x1 which achieves indifference between lottery A and B, that is the subject is 
indifferent between lottery A and B.  
In the next step of this procedure, that is the next 5 presented lotteries, we 
determine – again based on bisection -  an x2 that makes the subject indifferent between 
the lotteries (x1, p; R, 1-p) and (x2, p; r, 1-p). We continue this method until we have 
determined an x6, that is, we have 5*6=30 lottery choice questions in total, plus two 
consistency check questions. Another 32 questions that follow the same logic explained 
above, are presented for the elicitation of the utility function on losses. Note that in our 
experiment, we have set R to 100 € and r to 0 €; x0 has been set to 200 €3. These values 
are based on the suggestions of Abdellaoui (2000) and Wakker and Deneffe (1996). We 
start every 5-step bisection procedure for the elicitation of a new xi with a value of xi=xi-
1+500€. The interval, within which we determine the new xi via bisection is then [xi-1, xi-1 
+ 1000€]. Furthermore, p is set to 2/3 for all subjects and for all lottery choices, i.e. we 
exclude the perturbing effect of possibly different individual probability weighting 
functions for the construction of the utility function.  
 
 
                                                 
3 For the loss domain, we used the negative of the above values as R, r and x0, respectively. 
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Now, let u(·) denote the value- or utility-function on the gain or the loss domain 
and let w(·) denote the probability weighting function for the respective domain4. Then 
the constructed indifferences give pairs of equations of the following type: 
w(p) u(xi) + (1-w(p)) u(R)         =        w(p) u(xi+1) + (1-w(p)) u(r)   (1) 
w(p) u(xi+1) + (1-w(p)) u(R)         =        w(p) u(xi+2) + (1-w(p)) u(r)   (2) 
From these two equations it follows: 
u(xi+1) - u(xi)     =    u(xi+2) - u(xi+1)       (3) 
That is, in terms of utility, the trade-off of xi for xi+1 is equivalent to the trade-off 
of xi+1 for xi+2. We obtain a standard sequence of outcomes, {x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, 
which is –by construction- increasing for gains and decreasing for losses and which 
uniquely characterizes the individuals’ utility function since the xi are equally spaced in 
terms of their utility (see figure 1). 
 
Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we assume a power utility function, 
which is “by far the most popular form for estimating money value” (Prelec, 2000):  
⎩⎨
⎧
<−−
≥=
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α
        (4) 
α and β characterize the risk attitude of the individuals in the sense of a measure 
of proportional risk attitude (Eisenführ & Weber, 2003). Standard nonlinear least squares 
regression is used to estimate α and β, for gains and losses, respectively, in the above 
specification. A value of α and β equal to 1 denotes a linear utility function on gains and 
                                                 
4 That is, we implicitly assume that individual preferences can be represented by, e.g., 
(Cumulative) Prospect Theory. Note, however, that the value function that we elicit is, indeed, a 
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Equation (3) holds also under Expected Utility 
Theory, as can be found by substituting p for w(p) in equations (1) and (2). 
 11
losses, respectively. If α is larger than 1, the utility function is convex and the individual 
is risk-seeking on gains, if α is smaller than one, the individual is risk-averse on gains, 
since the utility function is concave. For β, the results hold conversely. The absolute 
difference between the risk parameters, α and β, and 1 is a measure for the curvature of 
the utility function: The higher this measure, the more the utility function is curved, i.e. 
the more it deviates from a linear function (see figure 3). Therefore, we define: a = | α-1 | 
and b = | β-1 | as indices for curvature, i.e. for the deviation of the particular utility 
functions from a linear function.  
 
*** insert figure 3 about here *** 
 
Linearity of the utility function means that people’s subjective value of a risky 
monetary lottery is determined by the multiplication of the stated monetary value and its 
(weighted) probability. Holding the lottery probabilities constant, if people place 
subjective valuations on the stated monetary outcomes, the utility function becomes 
curved, i.e. it deviates from linearity. When people can gamble to win money, a majority 
of people actually prefers a sure payoff over a gamble, even if the two prospects, i.e. 
choice options in the lottery, have the same expected monetary values. This preference 
for the sure payoff is an example of a risk-averse decision and it is a consequence of 
people placing subjective valuations on the stated monetary outcomes. Under positive 
monetary outcomes, the observation of risk averse decisions leads to the construction of a 
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concave utility function. The stronger the influence of subjective values, the more the 
decision deviates from the decision of an expected value maximizer.  
 
Individual preference for intuition and deliberation (PID) 
To assess people’s preference to decide intuitively or deliberately we used the 
PID (Preference for Intuition and Deliberation) scale (Betsch, submitted). The 
questionnaire consists of 18 questions, 9 items assessing the preference for deliberation 
(PID-D), and 9 items assessing the individual preference for intuition (PID-I). On a 5-
point scale, 1 indicating ‘I don’t agree’, 5 indicating ‘ I totally agree’, participants 
answered questions regarding their decision making habits. PID-D consists of items like 
‘I prefer making detailed plans to leaving things to chance’ or ‘I think before I act.’ PID-I 
includes items like ‘With most decisions it makes sense to rely on your feelings’ or ‘I 
carefully observe my deepest feelings’. In prior studies (total N > 2500; Betsch, 
submitted) the scale proved as reliable (Cronbach’s α for PID-D varied between 0.78 and 
0.84, for PID-I between 0.78 and 0.81), and the 2-dimensional structure was confirmed.  
The inventory captures a motive-like preference which is stable over time. A preference 
for a decision mode influences decision making especially in unconstrained situations 
(e.g. no time pressure, enough resources, etc.).  
In a correlative validation study (Betsch, submitted, study 3) people scoring high 
on deliberation prove to be conscientious perfectionists with a high need for structure. 
They aim at maximizing rather than satisficing their decision outcome. Highly intuitive 
people are speedy decision makers and tend to score high on social and emotion-bound 
personality dimensions like extraversion, agreeableness, and openness for experience. 
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People prefer a strategy because they think it is the best strategy in a decision situation 
and not because they are especially good in or bad in logical thinking or they do or do not 
like thinking hard.  
Based on the PID questionnaire each person can be classified as high or low 
intuitive and high and low deliberate. For most people one of the two strategies 
dominates the other. People with no preference may use the decision modes strongly 
dependent on the situation.   
 
4. Results 
From the total of 68 participants, 4 subjects are deleted from the sample5. These 4 
subjects apparently did not take the utility elicitation part of the experiment seriously. 
The 64 subjects that we keep in the sample show a preference reversal rate of 21.9 % on 
gains and 23.4 % on losses in the utility function elicitation part of the experiment. This 
reversal rate is similar to other reversal rates reported elsewhere (Abdellaoui (2000): 
17.9% and 13.7%; Camerer (1989): 26.5%; Starmer and Sugden (1989): 31.6% ). 
The median estimate of the utility functions on gains (α) is 0.89, with a mean standard 
error of the nonlinear least squares estimates of 0.055. In the loss domain β equals 0.90 
(se = 0.058). Abdellaoui (2000) finds 0.89 and 0.92 for α and β, respectively. The 
coefficients of determination approach 1 (0.996 for α and 0.995 for β). In total, the 
                                                 
5 Two of these subjects are outliers in terms of the time needed for the completion of the lottery 
questions: They needed less than 60 seconds for either the 32 lottery questions on gains or the 32 
questions on losses - considerably less than the other participants in the experiment. The two 
other subjects are outliers in terms of the standard error of the coefficient estimates of the utility 
function: Their standard error of the coefficient estimate is more than one standard deviation 
larger than the standard errors of coefficient estimates for all the other subjects. 
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results regarding people’s risk attitude are consistent with the predictions of prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and subsequent work based on prospect theory. 
 
Correlations with Preference for Intuitions and Deliberation (PID) 
 We hypothesized that the more deliberate a person is, the less curved the utility 
function should be; conversely, the more intuitive a person, the more curved the utility 
function. That is, we expect that both measures, a = | α-1 | and b = | β-1 |, are positively 
correlated with a preference for intuition and negatively correlated with a preference for 
deliberation.  
As predicted, a high preference for deliberation was negatively related to the 
curvature in the gain (a) and in the loss domain (b): r=-0.31 (p<0.01) for a and r=-0.24 
(p<0.05) for b. Thus, the more deliberate a decision maker, the less curved or the more 
linear was the utility function. Similarly, a high preference for intuition correlated 
positively with the curvature index. These effects hold only for the loss, but not the gain 
domain (r=0.19; p<0.06, and 0.09, ns. for b and a, respectively). The more intuitive a 
person was, the more curved was the utility function in the loss domain.  
 In two uni-ANOVAs with a and b as dependent variables we tested the proposed 
difference between intuitive and deliberate participants for significance. Participants were 
classified as intuitive when PID-I>PID-D and as deliberate when PID-D>PID-I. 4 
participants with equal values on both scales were excluded.  In the gain domain the 
index for curvature was Ma=0.43 (sd=0.56) for intuitives (N=17) and Ma=.25 (sd=0.19) 
for deliberates (N=43). The difference nearly approached significance (F(1,58)=3.4, 
p<0.07). In the loss domain the difference was not significant (F<1.2).  
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this experiment we showed that the curvature of individual value functions, 
assessed with an established elicitation method, is correlated with an individual 
preference for intuitive and deliberate decision-making. The more people prefer 
deliberate strategies the more linear is the utility function. On the contrary, the more 
intuitive a person is the more curved is the utility function. In an analysis of variance we 
find a close to significant effect showing that the index of curvature of the utility function 
is higher for intuitive than for deliberate people. We found empirical evidence for our 
hypothesis that a habitual individual-difference factor is systematically related to the 
observed differences in the curvature of individual utility functions. 
Deliberate decision makers seem to perform “valuation by calculation” (Hsee & 
Rottenstreich, 2004). That is, when taking their lottery choice, they tend to calculate the 
expected value of the presented lotteries, i.e. they multiply the objective value of the 
lottery and its probability – which results in a nearly linear utility function. The data 
showed that people with a stronger preference for intuition attach a subjective valuation 
to the perceived objective values of the lotteries6. This translates into a more curved 
utility function. The results of our experiment confirm our hypothesis, derived from the 
findings by Hsee & Rottenstreich (2004), that habitual decision modes might influence 
people’s decisions over monetary values.  
The degree of curvature of the utility function is interpreted as the risk attitude of 
the decision maker. Our findings suggest that intuitive people use the affective risk 
                                                 
6 Please note again that we have deliberately kept all probability values constant, such that the 
observed correlations do not result from differences in the perception or weighting of 
probabilities. 
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information contained in the lotteries when taking their decision. This affective influence 
might lead to the risk attitude: the feeling of risk is integrated in the judgment resulting in 
risk-averse or risk-seeking behavior. Deliberate people, on the contrary, seem to integrate 
only the stated values. It seems unlikely that deliberate people do not have any affective 
reactions to the lotteries. They might therefore abstract from this affective information 
and neglect it when making their judgment.  
This interpretation of the observed relationship between habitual decision modes 
and lottery choice behavior is in line with other research: In Kaufmann’s (2003) research, 
people were presented a list with returns of individual stocks, which differed in the total 
return and the variance of the return, i.e. the associated risk of the stock. People classified 
as intuitive based on the PID scale had a higher sensitivity towards the risk of the 
individual stocks than the rest of the sample. Similar to the findings in our study and 
consistent with the Risk-as-feelings-hypothesis (Loewenstein, et al., 2001), the risky 
stocks seem to trigger a feeling of risk that affects in particular intuitive people in their 
valuation of the lotteries. 
Our findings have several implications for future research in psychology and 
economics. They suggest that individually stable traits might help explain observed 
economic behaviour, such as portfolio choice and stock market decisions. The findings 
might be of particular relevance in finance and insurance decisions, where the question 
whether there are stable individual differences in reasoning or decision making 
competence, has recently gained interest (see Parker and Fischhoff (2003), Stanovich and 
West (1998) and Stanovich and West (2000)), for example in the context of investor 
overconfidence models (Glaser et al., 2004).  
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Although affect and risk perception is increasingly considered in the literature, the 
focus has mostly been on the influence of mood or affective states on risky decision-
making (e.g. Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Mano, 1994; Wright & Bower, 1992). In this 
work we consider the impact of intuitive or deliberate decision making based on the idea 
that the information content used for a judgment varies with respect to the individually 
preferred decision mode. While deliberate people rather use the stated information, 
intuitives seem to process not only the stated values but also their subjective feeling of 
how safe or how good a lottery is. People using affective information, i.e. people with a 
preference for intuition, may be more prone to the effects of mood on their decisions in 
risky situations. This implies that further experimental set-ups should control for mood 
effects. 
Our results suggest that people differ systematically in the way they solve risky 
decision problems, intuitive and deliberative processes and decision modes affect 
peoples’ decisions. Further theoretical and empirical research on decision-making under 
risk and uncertainty will profit from considering different decision modes, for example 
by assessing individual preferences for intuition and deliberation.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Utility function on gains for individual 1. The xi are equally spaced in 
terms of their utility. This allows for the assessment of the curvature of the value 
function. 
0,00
0,17
0,33
0,50
0,67
0,83
1,00
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500
€
u(
x)
 
  
x [ ] 
x0 
x1 
x2 
x3 
x4 
x5 
x6 
 24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: An example of the two presented lotteries. 
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Figure 3: The utility function on gains for various values of α. The absolute difference 
between the parameter α and 1 is a measure for the curvature of the utility function 
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